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NATIONAL FARMERS UNION AND ITS PROGENY:




Litigation involving individual Indians, Indian tribes, or controver-
sies arising within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reserva-
tion raise potential jurisdictional concerns which may involve
federal, state, and tribal courts. While litigants desire the most
favorable forum in which to adjudicate their claims, courts re-
quire a jurisdictional basis upon which to resolve the controversy.
Frequently, however, the desires of the litigants to be heard in
a given forum and the need of the courts to first establish jurisdic-
tion are in conflict. Courts must resolve jurisdictional conflicts
before any decision on the merits can be made.
While the jurisdictional conflicts involving federal and state
courts have been addressed over the past two centuries, conflicts
involving federal or state courts with Indian tribal courts are
relatively recent. Typically, these conflicts involve a non-Indian
litigant seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction based on grounds
that the claim involves a federal question or that there is diversity
of citizenship. Federal courts, however, have not readily accepted
jurisdiction if it can be shown that the court's assumption of
jurisdiction would conflict with tribal self-government.
Recently, federal jurisdiction in Indian Country' has become
subject to major reevaluation as a result of a United States Supreme
Court decision that requires all potential federal court controver-
sies initially be heard in tribal court and that the litigants must
exhaust all tribal court remedies before federal district court
authority can be invoked. The case, National Farmers Union Ins.
Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,2 further provides that the nature
* B.A., 1975, University of Colorado-Boulder; J.D., 1988, University of South Dakota
School of Law. Law Clerk, United States District Court, Rapid City, South Dakota.
Second place award, 1987 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition. Due
to delays in publication and the author's graduation from law school, the Review is
publishing this paper as a lead article.
1. Indian Country is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982) and generally applies to
all lands within an Indian reservation notwithstanding the issuance of any patents.
2. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 105 S. Ct. 2447,
2454 (1985).
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of federal district court authority, after the parties have exhausted
tribal court remedies, is limited to a review of tribal jurisdiction.
While this newly created federal review power appears benign,
it will be argued that such a change improperly usurps tribal
authority of self-government and, in effect, creates a new con-
cept of federal judicial authority. Furthermore, the practical ef-
fect of National Farmers Union is to impose additional burdens
on an already strained tribal court system.
This note will examine the application of federal jurisdiction
in general. From this beginning, an analysis will be made of
representative circuit courts of appeals cases, demonstrating some
of the problems which result from imposing federal jurisdiction
in Indian Country. These cases will be contrasted with the pre-
sent Supreme Court interpretation of federal jurisdiction in Indian
Country as first enunciated in National Farmers Union. Finally,
an argument will be made which suggests that the effect of National
Farmers Union on tribal institutions is to usurp tribal court author-
ity and relegate tribal courts to the status of adjuncts to the federal
judiciary.
Background
The United States judicial system is based upon a legislative
scheme which tends to promote conflicts between the sovereigns
of nation and state.3 The nature of this conflict is a major theme
in constitutional law.4 Sovereign authority requires that a court
have the ability to assume jurisdiction over litigants seeking to
avail themselves of its judicial power to enforce laws created by
the sovereign. The conflict between sovereigns arises when a citizen
of one nation or state seeks judicial enforcement of its laws against
the citizen of a different nation or state.'
Litigation involving Indians raises the additional concern of
preserving tribal sovereignty. While Indians are citizens of the
United States6 and of the states where they reside,7 they are also
subject to tribal sovereign authority which raises different con-
cerns for litigants, both Indian and non-Indian. Thus, many
litigeaits desire a neutral forum to hear their claims and accordingly
3. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
4. Id.
:5. KICKINGBI.D, KICKINGBIRD, CBIM & BEmK', INDIN SOVEIONTY (1977).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
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turn to the federal courts. However, the federal role in resolving
civil disputes in Indian Country has been limited to its jurisdic-
tional basis of federal question and diversity of citizenship.
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction Generally
Section 1331 of the Judicial Code provides that federal courts
"shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." ' Justice
Holmes adopted a narrow test for determining federal question
jurisdiction, holding that a case arises under the law of the
sovereignty which creates the cause of action.9 Thus, according
to Holmes, if a case arises under a cause of action created by
state law, the case arises under state law and federal jurisdiction
will not lie. However, the application of this test has been ex-
panded to allow federal question jurisdiction when the plaintiff's
complaint establishes that the claimed right to relief depends on
the construction or application of the Constitution or federal laws.'I
Therefore, a case may arise under federal law even if the cause
of action is state-created."
Federal question jurisdiction will not lie if a plaintiff anticipates
a federally-created defense by addressing this defense in the com-
plaint. 12 Stated another way, federal question jurisdiction will not
be found, even if the case will ultimately be decided under federal
law, if the issue of federal law was raised initially in the defense.
This rule, commonly known as the well-pleaded complaint rule,
cannot be used to circumvent federal question jurisdiction when
a plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint would fail to demonstrate the
presence of an issue of federal law.' 3
Until recently, invoking federal question jurisdiction has been
the same in Indian Country as in any state. As long as the re-
quirements for invoking federal court jurisdiction were met, ac-
tions could effectively be brought before a federal court. The mere
fact that a party was an Indian or an Indian tribe did not
automatically create a federal question." In addition, the fact that
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
9. American Well Works Co. v. Layne and Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
10. Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
11. M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTMON 59 (1985).
12. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
13. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 672 (1950).
14. Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 69 (8th Cir. 1974).
1989]
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the controversy arose in Indian Country did not necessarily create
federal question jurisdiction.' 5 However, National Farmers UnionI6
now establishes that federal question jurisdiction involving Indians
or matters arising on the reservation are subject to an initial
jurisdictional determination in tribal court.II This case reflects the
federal policy that the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged
must be given the initial opportunity to determine the validity of
the jurisdictional challenge."1
B. Diversity Jurisdiction Generally
Section 1332 of the Judicial Code provides that the federal
district courts shall have original jurisdiction in civil cases where
the matter in controversy exceeds the value of $50,000 and is be-
tween citizens of different states; citizens of a state, and subjects
of a foreign state; and subjects of a foreign state as a plaintiff
against citizens of a state.' 9 Additionally, corporations are deemed
citizens of the state of incorporation and of the state where they
have their principal place of business.20
Traditionally, the purpose of diversity jurisdiction in federal
courts has been to avoid possible prejudice against citizens of other
states or nations. 2' For diversity jurisdiction to lie in federal court,
complete diversity between the parties is required. 22 This require-
ment of complete diversity has developed as a result of statutory
construction, rather than as a requirement under the diversity clause
of Article 3, section 2 of the Constitution. 23 Because the Con-
stitution does not mandate the existence of complete diversity,
Congress is empowered to abolish or expand the requirement as
it sees fit. 24 Only in the context of interpleader has Congress not
required complete diversity between the parties. 2
Because diversity jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff and a
defendant be citizens of different states, questions arise concern-
15. Id.
16. National Farmers Union, 105 S. Ct. at 2447.
17. Id. at 2454.
18. Id.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982).
21. See REDISH, supra note 11, at 62.
22. Id.
23. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
24. See REDISH, supra note 11, at 62.
25. See State Farm, 386 U.S. 523 at 23.
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ing what constitutes citizenship of a given sovereignty. Accordingly,
Congress has determined that persons born in the United States
are American citizens, including persons who are born "to a
member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal
tribe .. .. ",,I Furthermore, by way of the fourteenth amendment,
persons born in the United States also became citizens of the states
in which they are born. 7 In making citizenship determinations,
courts generally have found that the concept of domicile refers
to one's home while residence refers to the place where a person
presently lives but intends to leave in the foreseeable future.2 8
In anticipation of parties seeking to create diversity where diver-
sity otherwise would not normally exist, Congress added to the
Judicial Code in 1948 that "[a] district court shall not have jurisdic-
tion of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or other-
wise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke
the jurisdiction of such court." 2 9 Therefore, it is not permissible
to "manufacture" diversity jurisdiction in federal courts.
Because Indians who reside on a reservation are citizens of the
state where the reservation is located, non-Indian parties domiciled
in the same state cannot invoke diversity jurisdiction on the basis
that tribal reservations are accorded quasi-sovereign status by the
federal system. Reservations are not foreign states within the mean-
ing of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.3" However, the
United States, through its trust responsibility, can invoke federal
court original diversity jurisdiction on behalf of Indians. 3
When diversity jurisdiction is invoked in Indian Country, federal
courts are more limited than elsewhere. 32 Because federal courts
acting through diversity jurisdiction are obliged to apply state law
in their adjudication of the controversy,33 they are, in essence,
sitting as an adjunct to state courts. In the context of Indian law,
however, problems are raised by the potential of the federal courts
to interfere with tribal self-government by assuming jurisdiction,
just as a state court's assumption of jurisdiction in tribal matters
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982).
27. See REDISH, supra note 11, at 64.
28. Id.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982).
30. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
31. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 316 (1982).
32. Id. at 317.
33. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 84 (1938), which requires federal
courts to apply state law in actions based on diversity.
19891
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would do.34 As a result, federal courts have been required to refuse
diversity jurisdiction, even though diversity jurisdiction would
normally lie, because of the potential of interfering with tribal
self-government."
C. Federal Jurisdiction As Historically Applied in Indian Country
Historically, Indian tribes have been regarded as distinct political
communities" with a complex and anomalous character in their
relationship with the federal government." When litigation involves
a non-Indian plaintiff against a tribal member or the tribe itself,
the parameters of the Indian tribal relationship with the federal
government are tested. For instance, in Littell v. Nakai,11 the non-
Indian General Counsel for the Navajo Tribe, who resided in
Maryland, brought an action in federal district court in Arizona
seeking an injunction against the Tribal Chairman for an alleged
breach of contract. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction. The court found
that strong congressional policy exists which vests responsibility
for tribal affairs in tribal court and that the tribal court should
remain free from outside interference." The Ninth Circuit noted
that the infringement test as enunciated in Williams v. Lee40 fur-
ther required its refusal to assume diversity jurisdiction, because
the action was based on the construction of a contract between
the parties which directly involved the tribe within the geographical
limits of the reservation.4
Another case which tested the parameters of the Indian tribal
relationship with the federal government is Hot Oil Service, Inc.
v. Hall." The plaintiff, a New Mexico corporation, sued a Navajo
tribal member in federal court in Arizona seeking a permanent
injunction and money damages against the Indian defendant. The
34. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), which prohibits state interference with
tribal self-government.
35. See, e.g., Little v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
986 (1965).
36. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978).
37. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
38. See Nekai, 344, F.2d 486.
39. Id. at 489.
40. See Lee, 358 U.S. 217.
41. See Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 at 490.
42. 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
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court held that it could not have diversity jurisdiction unless an
Arizona state court would also have subject matter jurisdiction. 3
Even though the action involved a lease of tribal land to a non-
Indian non-resident corporation, the suit still involved reserva-
tion affairs and therefore, state subject matter jurisdiction could
not be found." Accordingly, the court applied the Williams
infringement test and refused to find federal diversity jurisdiction.
Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit diversity cases of Littell and
Hot Oil, the Eighth Circuit was confronted with two cases which
challenged the validity of federal court jurisdiction over issues in-
volving individual Indian residents of the Standing Rock Sioux
Indian Reservation. In Schantz v. White Lightning,45 non-Indian
plaintiffs who were citizens of North Dakota brought a tort ac-
tion against an Indian resident of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian
Reservation in that portion of the reservation which is located
in North Dakota. The plaintiffs based their claim that the federal
court had jurisdiction on a federal statute which gave Indian tribes
within various states the option to consent to state court jurisdic-
tion over civil matters arising on the reservation.4 6 Because the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe did not elect state court assumption
of civil jurisdiction, the plaintiffs argued that both state and tribal
court lacked a jurisdictional basis to hear their claim and that
the federal court was the only forum properly suited to hear the
case. 7 Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit disagreed
with the plaintiffs and found that the action could only be litigated
in tribal court. 8 Whether or not a tribe has consented to state
court civil jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1322 does not, in itself,
compel a federal court to assume jurisdiction.4 9 The Eighth Circuit
held that the action was properly dismissed by the district court
for lack of federal question or diversity jurisdiction, since the
underlying basis of the action was in tort, involving a motor vehicle
collision, and all of the parties resided in North Dakota."
While neither the elements for diversity nor federal question
jurisdiction existed in Schantz, another case was decided the same
43. Id. at 297.
44. Id.
45. 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1982).
47. 502 F.2d at 69.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 70.
50. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
1989]
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day the Eighth Circuit decided Schantz. It involved, once again,
residents of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation. This
time, however, diversity jurisdiction was found. In Poitra v.
Demarrias5" a wrongful death action was brought by an Indian
resident of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation who
resided on that portion of the Reservation located in North Dakota.
The defendant was also a member of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe but resided on that portion of the Reservation located in
South Dakota. The court found that diversity jurisdiction was not
precluded by reason of the absence of tribal consent to state court
jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a). 22 Therefore, even though
the courts of North Dakota lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
civil causes of action arising in Indian Country, federal court
jurisdiction could still be found by reason of diversity." The court
further reasoned that federal courts sitting in diversity are not
required to narrowly apply the Erie Doctrine in that it is not
necessary to mirror state law. 4 Additionally, the court did not
find a bar to its jurisdiction just because North Dakota lacked
civil jurisdiction over the controversy, but due to the unique status
of "Indians under federal [law], not because of any state policy
consideration." 55
Mindful of Littell and Hot Oil, which held that diversity jurisdic-
tion was precluded in disputes arising on the Navajo Indian Reser-
vation unless Arizona State courts also had subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the Eighth Circuit distinguished these cases with Poitra. The
court in Poitra found the Ninth Circuit cases were based on the
Williams infringement test of non-interference with tribal affairs. 6
Both cases obviously had in issue whether or not the action in-
terfered with tribal self-government, with Littell involving the tribal
chairman and Hot Oil involving tribal trust lands. Furthermore,
neither case involved a state created cause of action, such as North
Dakota's wrongful death statute, under which an Indian sought
recovery from another Indian."' Therefore, because the dispute
involved a state-created wrongful death statute and did not in-
51. 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974).
52. 502 F.2d at 24.
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id. at 27 (emphasis supplied).




A NEW FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM?
volve issues of tribal lands or customs, the Poitra court finally
concluded that "no possible interference with tribal or reserva-
tion self-government [can be found, and] there is no reason why
Hot Oil or Littell should control this case."
58
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit decided a case which involved over
200 disabled Navajo Indian miners and their families seeking
damages incurred by long-term exposure to radon radiation in
uranium mines owned by the defendants. The case, Begay v. Kerr-
McGee Corp. ,59 once again brought into conflict the issue of
whether federal or state courts should decide the claims asserted
by the plaintiffs. The defendant, Kerr-McGee Corp., argued that
the sole remedy provided by Arizona law for the alleged injuries
was an administrative claim for worker's compensation vested
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of
Arizona.6° The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal
of the action holding that their reliance on Williams v. Lee61 in
both Hot Oil and Littell supported their view that these cases
are better viewed as decisions construing [28 U.S.C.] section
1332(a) to preclude a non-Indian plaintiff from obtaining federal
judicial resolution of a dispute which Williams v. Lee vests in
the tribe's exclusive jurisdiction. It would be inappropriate to
permit a federal court to exercise its diversity jurisdiction over
a state-law controversy which Williams v. Lee prohibits the state
courts from entertaining.
62
In Begay the Ninth Circuit also found that nothing in the prin-
ciples of federalism suggest that a state statute can operate to divest
a federal court of jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
63
Therefore, state law may not control or limit federal court diver-
sity jurisdiction because federal law, pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause, pre-empts any contrary state law.64
The Ninth Circuit resolved any apparent conflict between state
and federal law by finding that state compensation laws are ap-
plicable to all United States territory within a state.65 Therefore,
58. Id. at 29.
59. 682 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
60. Id. at 1314.
61. See Lee, 358 U.S. 217.
62. Begay, 682 F.2d at 1317.
63. Id. at 1316.
64. Id. at 1315.
65. Id. at 1319, citing 40 U.S.C. § 290 (1982).
1989]
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claims by Indian plaintiffs against non-Indian employers are ntot
matters of self-governance subject to the Williams infringement
test. "[T]he exercise of state jurisdiction over such claims does
not, even minimally, infringe upon or frustrate tribal self-
government."66
The final case to be discussed in this historical overview of
federal jurisdiction as applied in Indian Country is R.J. Williams
Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority.6 7 In this case, the initial
plaintiffs were residents of the State of Washington and the defen-
dant was a tribal corporation with its principal place of business
in Montana.68 The plaintiffs challenged a tribal court writ of at-
tachment after the Housing Authority claimed that the plaintiffs
failed to correct defects in their construction of housing for the
tribe. The Circuit Court agreed with the District Court's finding
that the court had proper jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133169
but found that the plaintiffs failed to state a federal claim for
which relief could be granted.7" However, whether or not diver-
sity or a federal question existed was not controlling because the
R.J. Williams court found that at the time of the initiation of
the action, there was some question whether the Fort Belknap
Tribe had exercised its right to assume exclusive jurisdiction under
its tribal code. The Fort Belknap Code provided that the tribal
court had jurisdiction to hear suits in matters where the defen-
dant was a member of the Fort Belknap Indian Community.71
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded and held that "any
determination of whether diversity jurisdiction exists will have to
await a decision by the Fort Belknap Community Court on jurisdic-
tion over this controversy." 72
As can be seen, federal courts have historically hesitated to
assume federal jurisdiction over matters involving Indians, Indian
tribes, or controversies arising on the reservation, whether or not
the action is based on federal question jurisdiction or on diver-
sity. Federal courts regularly divest themselves of diversity jurisdic-
66. Id. at 1319.
67. 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983).
68. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. For another recent case which construes
federal jurisdictional authority over a tribal corporation, see Weeks v. Oglala Sioux Housing
Authority, 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986).
69. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
70. R.J. Wiliams, 719 F.2d at 981.
7". Id. at 983.
72. Id. at 985.
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tion whenever the dispute involves the exercise of tribal self-
government as first demonstrated in Williams v. Lee and the cases
previously discussed. Clearly, tribal courts are "generally the
exclusive forum for the adjudication of disputes affecting the
interests of both Indians and non-Indians which arise on the
reservation."
73
D. Federal Jurisdiction Presently Applied in Indian Country
A unanimous United States Supreme Court recently concluded
in National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,4
that the question of whether a federal court has diversity or federal
question jurisdiction over matters involving Indians, Indian tribes
or controversies arising within a reservation, requires an initial
determination by the tribal court of its jurisdictional authority."
However, a new requirement is imposed by the National Farmers
Union court in that all tribal court remedies must first be exhausted
before further federal court review is permissible.
7 6
The controversy arose in National Farmers Union when a minor
Indian resident was struck by a motorcycle while on the state owned
schoolgrounds of a local elementary school within the Crow Indian
Reservation. The Indian minor and his guardian brought an ac-
tion in Crow Tribal Court seeking damages. Service of process
was made on the Chairman of the School Board who subsequently
failed to notify anyone of the suit. A default judgment was entered
pursuant to the rules of the tribal court and a copy of the judg-
ment was delivered to the school principal who forwarded it to
the school's insurer, National Farmers Union. A few days later,
National Farmers Union sought a temporary restraining order in
Federal District Court in Montana claiming that a writ of execu-
tion issued by the tribal court would cause irreparable damage
to the school district and would violate their constitutional and
statutorily protected rights. The District Court agreed and ordered
the tribal court not to issue a writ of execution. Approximately
two months later, the district court granted National Farmers
Union's request for a permanent injunction on the basis that the
Crow Tribal Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the tort
73. Id. at 983.
74. National Farmers Union, 105 S. Ct. 2447 (1985).
75. Id. at 2454.
76. Id.
1989]
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action that was the basis of the default judgment. 77 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed and reversed, concluding that the district court's
jurisdiction could not be supported on any constitutional, statutory,
or common law basis."
The Supreme Court found that the question whether or not
the Crow Tribal Court had "the power to compel a non-Indian
property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court
is one that must be answered by reference to federal law and is
a 'federal question' under [28 U.S.C.] § 1331." 7 Therefore, the
Court found that "[tihe District Court correctly concluded that
a federal court may determine under § 1331 whether a tribal court
has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction." 8
Interestingly, the Court enunciated a standard for review:
[The existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will
require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent
to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminish-
ed, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive
Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and ad-
ministrative or judicial decisions. [footnote omitted]"'
After this enunciated standard of review, the Court announced
that the examination of the tribal court's jurisdiction should be
made by the tribal court on the policy basis which
favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is
being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual
and legal bases for the challenge. Moreover [sic] the orderly
administration of justice in the federal court will be served by
allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before
either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief
is addressed. [Footnotes omitted]1
2
National Farmers Union is similar to its predecessor cases, which
explore the parameters of federal jurisdiction in matters involv-
ing Indians or Indian tribes, in that all recognize the importance
77. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp. 213,
214 (D. Mont. 1983).
78. National Farmers Union, 560 F. Supp. at 2450.
79. Id. at 2452.
80. Id.
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of maintaining tribal authority to decide controversies which affect
tribal interests. National Farmers Union, however, imposes a new
element in the factors which are determinative of whether or not
a federal court can accept jurisdiction over the controversy. Now
federal courts must ask if all appropriate tribal court remedies
have been exhausted83 prior to any further federal judicial review."
The scope of National Farmers Union was further developed
in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. La Plante." The plaintiff, Iowa
Mutual, sought a declaration in Federal District Court that it had
no duty to defend and indemnify its insured against the personal
injuries asserted by La Plante. This action was filed after La Plante,
a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, initiated a suit in Blackfeet
Tribal Court against Iowa Mutual's insured for the personal in-
juries La Plante incurred on a ranch located within the Blackfeet
Indian Reservation.
Iowa Mutual sought federal court intervention over the pend-
ing Blackfeet Tribal Court proceeding alleging diversity of citizen-
ship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).11 La Plante moved to dismiss
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court
agreed with La Plante and held that the Blackfeet Tribal Court
must first be given the opportunity to determine its own jurisdic-
tion." The district court further noted that only if the Blackfeet
Tribal Court refused to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction would
the federal court be free to entertain the case under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332.88
The Supreme Court took the opportunity in Iowa Mutual not
only to reiterate its position as enunciated in National Farmers
Union, but also to expand upon the scope of that decision.
Recognizing that National Farmers Union was based on whether
or not a federal question existed, the Court held in Iowa Mutual
that issues of diversity jurisdiction were also subject ot the ex-
haustion of tribal court remedies requirement. The Iowa Mutual
Court stated, "[iun diversity, as well as federal-question cases, un-
conditional access to the federal forum would place it in direct
83. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
85. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987).
86. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
87. Iowa Mutual, 107 S. Ct. at 975.
88. Id.
1989]
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competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's
authority over reservation affairs." 89
The Court disagreed with Iowa Mutual's assertion that diver-
sity jurisdiction was justified to protect "against local bias and
incompetence." 90 In rejecting this argument, the Court stated that
"[t]he alleged incompetence of tribal courts is not among the ex-
ceptions to the exhaustion requirement established in National
Farmers Union."'" The Court clearly reaffirmed its position that
tribal. courts are initially the proper forum to evaluate any challenge
made against its jurisdiction.92
The Iowa Mutual Court upheld the parameters of National
Farmers Union by stating:
Although [Iowa Mutual] must exhaust available tribal remedies
before instituting suit in federal court, the Blackfeet Tribal
Court's determination of tribal jurisdiction is ultimately subject
to review. If the Tribal Appeals Court upholds the lower court's
determination that the tribal courts have jurisdiction, [Iowa
Mutual] may challenge that ruling in the District Court ...
Unless a federal court determines that the Tribal Court lacked
jurisdiction, however, proper deference to the tribal court system
precludes relitigation of issues raised by the La Plantes ....
Analysis
All courts, whether they are federal, state or tribal, must in-
itially ascertain the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the litigants. A court which makes a decision where jurisdic-
tion is lacking renders such decision useless and ineffective.
However, challenges to a particular court's jurisdiction are often
made where a state or tribal court has assumed jurisdiction and
a litigant feels the proper forum should be the federal courts. Under
these circumstances, a federal court is concerned that by assum-
ing jurisdiction, it will interfere with either a state or tribal court's
exclusive right to adjudicate the cause of action giving rise to the
controversy. 9 However, federal courts are often asked to hear
89. Id. at 977.
90. Id. at 978.
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. See generally National Farmers Union, 105 S. Ct. at 2454.
93. Iowa Mutual, 107 S. Ct. at 978.
94. For further discussion, see supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
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cases which normally would be heard in a state or tribal court.
If the parties are from different states or nations, the federal forum
best protects against local bias. 9" Because of this unique role pro-
vided by the federal courts, many litigants have sought federal
court forums they believe will be more conducive to their interests.
A. Federal Jurisdiction Under National Farmers Union
In National Farmers Union96 and Iowa Mutual7 the United
States Supreme Court clearly established that litigants who are
individual Indians or Indian tribes, or controversies which arise
on a reservation, are subject to exhaustion of all tribal court
remedies before federal courts can review the case. This require-
ment, according to the Court, properly reflects the Congressional
policy of fostering Indian self-government. While this exhaustion
requirement is meritorious with regard to the Supreme Court's
understanding of Congressional policy,98 a new federal relation-
ship with Indian tribal courts has been created by the parameters
of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual.
Prior to these two recent cases, litigants in cases such as Littell 9
and Poitra'" sought federal court adjudication of their claims based
on diversity jurisdiction. Even though diversity was denied in Littell
and found in Poitra, under National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual the federal court could not have even considered the parties'
attempts to obtain federal jurisdiction. Instead, the parties would
have been required to exhaust all tribal court remedies. Under
these circumstances, cases such as Poitra would never have been
allowed to continue in federal court. However, prior to National
Farmers Union, once the tribal court in such a case had reached
the merits further appellate review in federal court was precluded.
Simply, federal review of tribal court decisions was not possible
unless such review was claimed under the habeous corpus provi-
sions of the Indian Civil Rights Act.' 1
As a result of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, tribal
courts are now subject to federal district court review.'0 2 Although
95. For further discussion, see supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
96. See National Farmers Union, 105 S. Ct. 2447.
97. See Iowa Mutual, 107 S. Ct. 971.
98. Id. at 975-76.
99. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
101. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
102. See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
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the language of National Farmers Union suggests that such review
is limited only to whether or not the tribal court had proper
jurisdiction,' 0 3 these cases signal a significant incursion into tribal
sovereignty. Even though there may be some legitimate concerns
over the possible unfair treatment by tribes of both Indians and
non-Indians, the "second-guess" intrusion into tribal sovereignty
by federal courts outweighs the need for subsequent federal judicial
review.
0 4
B. A New Federalism
The Supreme Court in National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual interpreted the Congressional policy of tribal self-
determination to include tribal sovereignty, as exercised through
its judiciary, but with such sovereignty now subject to federal
district court review. Interestingly, the Court never cited to a federal
statute, regulation or to any legislative history which would sup-
port their view of Congressional policy in this area. Furthermore,
the Court's decisions create a paradox. On one hand, Congres-
sional policy is to facilitate tribal self-governance under notions
of tribal sovereignty but, on the other hand, this "self-governance"
is now subject to federal judicial review.
Tribal courts have been accorded judicial authority to hear mat-
ters properly before them. In fact, ever since William v. Lee, tribes
have exercised their authority whenever state incursion would in-
fringe upon their soeverign right to make laws and to be governed
by these laws. The effect of National Farmers Union on tribal
courts arguably creates a new branch of the federal judiciary. Tribal
courts are now quite similar to the courts created legislatively by
Congress, such as territorial courts, local courts in the District
of Columbia, military courts, and tax courts. Even though the
substantive laws are largely supplied by Congress, legislative courts
may still exercise at least a portion of the federal judicial power-' 01
for instance, legislative courts may apply federal common-law doc-
trines. Although tribal courts apply substantive law as provided
by their tribal code and common-law, tribal laws are still subject
to the plenary authority of Congress, just as the laws of the legisla-
tive courts are subject to Congressional authority. In fact, many
103. National Farmers Union, 105 S. Ct. at 2453-54.
104. Cf. C. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law 116 (1987).
105. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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tribal codes are a reflection of direct Congressional creation of
substantive law such as those codes created under the provisions
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.1°6
Finally, it may even be argued that National Farmers Union,
and its creation of limited federal review authority, relegates tribal
courts to adjuncts of the federal courts. While permitted to adjudi-
cate matters as defined by their code, subject to Congress' plenary
authority, tribal courts will facilitate "the orderly administration
of justice in the federal court [which] will be served by allowing
a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either
the merits or any questions concerning appropriate relief is ad-
dressed." 107 The Court even supplies a standard of review which
includes an examination of the extent [to which] tribal sovereignty
has been altered, divested or diminished read in conjunction with
treaties, administrative or judicial [federal] decisions. 108
C. National Famers Union Practically Applied
The cost of litigation, whether the case is before a federal, state
or tribal court, is expensive. However, these costs are particularly
onerous for litigants who are confronted with economic problems
such as poverty, unemployment or ill health.' These problems
are particularly acute on Indian reservations.
National Farmers Union now requires that litigants must not
only bear the expense of litigation in tribal court but must also
undertake expensive federal court review. Undoubtedly, litigants
such as National Farmers Union Insurance Company or Iowa
Mutual Insurance Company will elect federal district court review
of adverse decisions made by tribal courts. In doing so, these cor-
porate entities will make it necessary for the other parties to the
action to bear the costs of their required role in the review process.
Unfortunately, there will be additional delays in the ultimate resolu-
tion of a controversy while a review action is docketed in the federal
system. Parties, such as Edward La Plante, ' l1 who seek damages
106. 25 U.S.C. § 461, 464-479 (1982); 25 U.S.C. § 463 (Supp. 1986). For further discussion,
see Hammerstein & Fechite, Tribal Immunity, Tribal Courts, and the Federal System:
Emerging Contours and Frontiers, 31 S.D.L. REv. 553 (1986).
107. National Farmers Union, 105 S. Ct. at 2454.
108. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion on how these factors are burdensome on tribal economic develop-
ment, see Pommersheim, Economic Development in Indian Country: What Are the Questions?,
12 Azi. IrDiAN L. REv. 195 (1987).
110. Edward La Plante is one of the parties in Iowa Mutual.
19891
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
for injuries must now wait for the federal judiciary to perform
its obligations as construed by National Farmers Union where
before, La Plante's claims could be fully redressed by the tribal
court.
Another practical effect of National Farmers Union is the uncer-
tainty it raises in litigation involving regulatory issues before the
tribal court. While some tribes may be in the same position as
the Blackfeet Indian Tribe in Iowa Mutual where the Tribe's ad-
judicative jurisdiction was co-extensive with its legislative jurisdic-
tion, I II not all tribes are similarly structured. Therefore, whether
National Farmers Union is applicable to regulatory matters in
Indian Country remains to be decided.
Probably the most significant practical effect that National
Farmers Union will have in Indian Country is the impetus it will
give to tribes to update, enact or modify their tribal codes which
will provide [or reject] a jurisdictional framework for civil litigation
in tribal court. Tribes will also have to evaluate the consequences
of providing [or refusing to provide] for an appellate procedure,
since particular mention of the notion was made in Iowa Mutual:
"At a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal
appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determina-
tions of the lower tribal courts.""I2 Regardless of whether a tribe
desires to comply with these dictates, it is fiscally difficult for
tribes already burdened with inadequate general revenues to create
an additional level of tribal courts.
Finally, National Farmers Union does provide a clear indication,
in spite of its failings, that the federal judiciary wants to provide
support to newly emerging tribal courts. Perhaps the Supreme
Court used National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual as a policy
statement for Congressional consideration. In any event, it is quite
obvious that National Farmers Union and its progeny will have
far-:reaching effects on tribal court development.
Conclusion
In the past, federal court jurisdiction over litigants who were
individual Indians or Indian tribes or when the controversy arose
on the reservation, were asked by the parties to assume either
federal question or diversity jurisdiction to allow the litigants a
111. Iowa Mutual, 107 S. Ct. at 974.
112. Id. at 977.
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favorable forum to adjudicate their claims. Federal courts largely
relied upon the Williams v. Lee infringement test and would refuse
jurisdiction if they found that assumption of jurisdiction would
infringe upon the tribe's right to self-government.
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual changed the approach
litigants must take to avail themselves of federal court jurisdiction.
Now litigants must exhaust all tribal court remedies before in-
voking federal judicial authority. However, it can be argued that
this new federal court requirement usurps tribal authority and
relegates tribal courts to some unclear status in a new notion of
federalism.
At its best National Farmers Union clears up the uncertainty
of whether or not federal jurisdiction lies in a particular case.
Instead, litigants go directly to tribal court, assuming such court
has jurisdiction, and exhaust all tribal court remedies. At its worst,
National Farmers Union forces tribal courts and tribal councils
to join the federal judicial system, regardless of whether or not
this is an infringement of tribal self-government. The question
presently remains whether Congress will be forced to become in-
volved and codify the parameters of federal jurisdiction as enunci-
ated in National Farmers Union.
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